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Abstract: The liability of credit rating agencies (‘CRAs’) has been subject to critical debate 
since the global financial crisis of 2008. It has been well documented and argued that the 
rules governing such impositions have been traditionally framed by reactionary, post-crisis 
driven reforms which do not necessarily reflect, or capture, in economic terms, the 
consequentialist aspects of whether they are beneficial to the welfare of wider market 
participants. This article attempts to highlight, through economic analysis, some of these 
wider market repercussions, and will aim to do so by providing an analysis of liability rules 
from a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency perspective. It is hoped that this analysis will add further 
insight to the question of liability and regulation, chiefly in aiding our ability of determining 
whether current regulatory reforms on credit rating agencies, principally within the European 
Union, are sufficiently robust in addressing the problem of poor regulatory incentives.  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, the liability of CRAs is again in focus.1 
The persistent overrating of subprime mortgage loans – chiefly in the form of packaged 
securities known as collaterised debt obligations (‘CDOs’)2 – and overconfidence in markets 
have led to the need to establish stronger liability rules.3 The question of CRA liability is not 
new.4 In fact, since the collapse of Enron in the aftermath of the NASDAQ bubble in 2001, 
there have been increased efforts to develop and improve the regulatory oversight of CRAs. 
Public interest theories over financial market regulation is at the centre of these competing 
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2 For an introduction into the root causes of the recent financial crisis, see Edward Kane, ‘Incentive Roots of the 
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13 North Carolina Banking Institute 5. 
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theories (amongst other economic theories of regulation),5 with the imposition of liability 
rules forming an important part of the regulatory discussion.6  
The imposition of liability rules invites normative considerations. Central to the 
question in economic analysis of law, as is the principal thesis of normative economics, is the 
rule’s efficiency.7 For many years, prior to the emergence of neoclassical law and economics, 
liability rules have largely attracted the weighing of cognate concepts of justice, morality, and 
rights, which are often known to be loosely associated with the philosophical underpinnings 
of Kantian ethical theories advocated for in the schools of legal positivism and 
deontologism.8 The basis for imposing liability rules and claims in the context of credit rating 
agencies is no different. Since the financial crisis, many have argued that stricter regulation is 
necessary, and that agencies should be held accountable for the range of harmful, foreseeable 
externalities caused by their perceived lack of due diligence.  
This article explores many of these considerations, evaluating both within and beyond 
the normative assignment of rights and duties as is usually argued from a moral standpoint. 
Principles advanced in the field of law and economics are incorporated, as are the predictive 
aspects of economic consequentialism,9 to assess the efficacy of liability rules governing 
credit rating agencies from an efficiency perspective. The article begins by considering, in 
section B, the normative aspects of liability law, in an attempt to explicate the rationale and 
purpose for utilising the efficiency criterion in the analysis. Sections C and D will apply the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion to the CRA context, examining, through positive analysis, several 
insights overlooked in the consideration of liability rules. This will be done through 
considering the recent amendments made under Article 35(a) of the European Union 
Regulation.10 Section E considers the economic theories of liability, drawing on comparisons 
between negligence and strict liability regimes, and will subsequently look to evaluate how 
they would apply in the contemporary context of CRAs. Section G provides an evaluation of 
																																																						
5 Charles Goodhart, Financial Regulation: Why, how and where now? (Routledge 1998); Richard Posner, 
‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 335. 
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9 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, ‘Fairness Versus Welfare’ (2001) 114 Harvard Law Review 961. 
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the various deficiencies and assumptions made in normative economic analysis, before 
briefly addressing certain potential concerns arising from the article’s core assumptions. 
 
B. LIABILITY RULES, EFFICIENCY, AND JUSTICE 
1. Why efficiency? 
The aim and purpose of liability rules may simply depend on one’s philosophical conviction. 
Generally, traditional legal scholars would argue two objectives of liability law: (1) 
compensation of victims for having unfairly suffered harm, and (2) the need to deter injurers 
from committing further harm.11 From a strictly deontological perspective, such rules by 
themselves possess significant moral worth, not necessarily in the purpose to be attained by 
it, but in the maxim according to which the action itself is determined.12 In the context of 
CRAs, we can assert that if one rating agency is proven to be negligent or fraudulent ex post, 
investors should be compensated for having unfairly suffered losses through having relied, 
assuming diligently, on inaccurate ratings. The setting of precedent then may, or may not, 
incentivise CRAs to produce more accurate ratings.13 
The recent Australian decision of Bathurst14 is one example that echoed this 
moralistic bend, confirming that CRAs owed a duty of care to investors on the basis that 
rating agencies should have known that potential investors would rely on its opinion when 
determining the creditworthiness of rated products, in particular when making their decisions 
to invest. The assumption of foreseeability here is an example of an intuitive moral decree, as 
the outcome relies heavily on what one perceives to be sufficiently or reasonably foreseeable, 
and whether one should be penalised on that basis.15 Whether or not such an approach would 
be validated by courts in other regions under the common law is yet to be seen.16  
Liability claims under the common law have for long echoed the Kantian foundations 
of moral absolutism,17 ie that rights and duties specifically defined remain absolute as 
determined by the moral law. The imposition of statutory liability rules for CRAs imposes, 
																																																						
11 Guido Calabresi and A Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089. 
12 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’ (1980) 9 The Journal of Legal Studies 191. 
13 Jacob Kleinlow, ‘Civil Liability of Credit Rating Companies: Quantitative Aspects of Damage Assessment 
from an Economic Viewpoint’ (2015) 11 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 134. 
14 ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCAFC 65. 
15 This does not suggest that legal analyses under the rudiments of the common law function entirely on intuitive 
basis without any moral legitimacy. Rather, it attempts to highlight that the analysis could be more inclusive, 
particularly to wider and more extensive considerations beyond commonly-held moral intuitions. For a more 
extensive introduction, see Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory’ (n 7). 
16 For an analysis of potential liability claims in the UK, see Kern Alexander, ‘Tort Liability for Ratings of 
Structured Securities Under English Law’ (2015) 11 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 26. 
17 Kaplow and Shavell (n 9). 
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for example, a duty not to lie (CRAs), and a right not to be lied to (investors).18 The question 
of whether courts should utilise a strictly deontological approach in finding the appropriate 
assignment of rights and duties is not straightforward. The benefit of normative economic 
analysis lies in its consequentialist approach of law.19 The complexity of financial markets 
means that wider economic considerations are usually pertinent when considering liability 
rules. Punishing agencies simply on grounds of rights and duties, or morality and justice, may 
not be as straightforward as it would be in other traditional liability claims such as murder, 
trespass, or theft, for example. Moral arguments for compensating investor losses are filled 
with contradictions. In financial markets, aspects of liability rules greatly impact the welfare 
of all market participants, as this article hopes to highlight.20  
This is not to suggest that cases of murder, trespass, or theft are less morally arbitrary 
(in fact, they very often are), but rather that adopting a consequentialist perspective aids our 
normative analysis of liability.21 Efficiency perspectives are relevant not because they replace 
our deontological foundations of law. Instead, they illuminate conclusive normative 
directions to anyone for whom ‘efficiency, or the particular concept of efficiency that the 
particular economist is advancing, happens to be the ruling value’.22 In other words, in 
determining whether a particular rule or decision is efficient, we are then better able to come 
to a conclusion as to whether that rule or decision is morally acceptable.23 Positive 
descriptions may further illuminate whether the current liability regime can be explained 
through the concept of efficiency.24 Explicating these descriptions may then help us redesign 
our laws to achieve equally valid or even better moral ends, albeit utilising different logical 
inspections.  
2. A positive and normative description of liability rules 
Liability rules are established where there is some perceivable form of market failure which, 
given high transaction costs, requires the intervention of judges to help foster the transaction 
that ‘free market transactions would have brought about had they been feasible’.25 In this 
																																																						
18 For an introduction into the concepts of morality, law and economics, see Kaplow and Shavell (n 10). For a 
lighter introduction, see Edward Stringham and Mark White, ‘Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Austrian and 
Kantian Perspectives’ in Margaret Oppenheimer and Nicholas Mercuro, Law and Economics: Alternative 
Economic Approaches to Legal and Regulatory Issues (ME Sharpe 2004) 374. 
19 Kaplow and Shavell (n 9). 
20 Eugene Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25 Journal of 
Finance 383. 
21 Richard Posner, ‘The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law’ (1980) 15 Georgia Law Review 851.  
22 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7) 110. 
23 Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency’ (n 7). 
24 Posner, ‘The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law’ (n 21).  
25 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7) 108. 
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sense, many commonly accepted moral rights are validated ex post by the efficiency criterion. 
Where they conflict therefore should not necessarily lead us to decide one way or another, but 
rather exposes the similarities and deficiencies both approaches posit in our normative 
finding of the best possible solution.26 Positive descriptions of law do not justify that 
efficiency be the sole criterion, but only that it explicates our logical consistency. A positive 
theory generates, in other words, empirically testable hypotheses often supported and refuted 
by our evaluation of the results.27 
3. Assignment of duties and rights  
In assigning rights and duties, the problem of arbitrary assignment abounds. A deontological 
approach may define our rights through clear assignment of duties, providing it with absolute 
moral worth on its own.28 Neoclassical law and economics, however, would attempt to define 
rights and duties more broadly. This article contends that a positive description of CRA 
liability reveals that many factors have been overlooked. Moral arguments for compensating 
investor losses are not straightforward. It is hard to bolster the claim that public investors 
should be awarded rights to compensation simply on grounds of unfairness. Nor is it easy to 
argue that CRAs should be immune from civil liability claims. Recent literature posits that 
the arguments can be circular and yet provides no clear, normative conclusions.29 Defining 
property rights in a way that will maximise wealth may help illuminate clearer grounds for 
judicial decision-making.30 If a particular assignment of rights maximises the welfare of 
market participants, then the moral claim for that assignment becomes a valid consideration. 
These considerations need not be viewed as absolute or normatively conclusive. 
From a Pareto-efficiency standpoint (a principle explored in this article), the question 
of CRA liability is straightforward: which allocation of rights maximises wealth?31 In order 
to answer this question, we would have to consider different forms of liability rules to decide 
on one that truly maximises wealth. The central consideration of this article will be the 
assignment of rights before and after the enactment and implementation of the European 
Union Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies (‘CRA III’).32 The article further extends the 
																																																						
26 Mario Rizzo, ‘The Mirage of Efficiency’, (1980) 8 Hofstra Law Review 641. 
27 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7) 110. 
28 Stringham and White, ‘Economic Analysis of Tort Law’ (n 18) 374. 
29 Ellis, Fairchild and D’Souza (n 4). 
30 Kaplow and Shavell (n 9). 
31 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7).  
32 CRA III (n 10) art 35(a). 
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analysis by comparing the regimes of strict liability and negligence.33 Both paradigms 
provide different assignment of rights, and lead to rather different allocative outcomes.  
 
C. THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF KALDOR-HICKS EFFICIENCY 
1. Pareto-optimality, Pareto-superiority and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
To understand the normative basis of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, it is important first to establish 
other aspects of efficiency as employed under economic analysis of law.34 Pareto-optimality 
and Pareto-superiority are central theories that share normative relationships with Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency. Both concepts express standards for ranking or describing states of affairs: 
(i) The Pareto-superiority criterion relates two states of affairs before concluding that ‘one is 
an improvement over the other if at least one person’s welfare improves while no one else’s 
welfare is diminished’;35 (ii) Pareto-optimality is a state of allocation where it is impossible to 
make any one individual better off without making at least one other person worse off.36 The 
optimality standard ‘relates one distribution to all possible distributions and says, in effect, 
that no Pareto improvements can be made from any Pareto-optimal state’.37 In other words, 
Pareto-optimal distributions have no distributions Pareto-superior to them. 
 
Figure 1(a): Pareto-Optimal distributions.38 
As with Pareto-superiority, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is a relational property states of 
affairs, and defines a state as efficient if compensation from the largest winners to losers is 
hypothetically possible. A fuller definition can be provided as the following: 
																																																						
33 Steven Shavell, ‘Strict Liability versus Negligence’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 1.  
34 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7). 
35 Jules Coleman, ‘Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximisation’ (1980) 8 Hofstra Law Review 509, 513. 
36 ibid 512. 
37 ibid 513. 
38 This graph is used for illustration purposes only for the benefit of the reader and is adopted from Coleman (n 
35) 517. 
The comparisons can be summarised in Figure 1(a):  
I. c is Pareto-superior to x, but Pareto-noncomparable to y. 
II. f is Pareto-superior to y, but Pareto-noncomparable to x. 
III. c and f are Pareto-noncomparable. 
IV. c and f are Pareto-superior to z. 
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One state of affairs (E’) is Kaldor-Hicks efficient to another (E) if and only if those 
whose welfare increases in the move from E to E’ could fully compensate those whose 
welfare diminishes with a net gain in welfare.39 
It is important to note that Kaldor-Hicks improvements do not require compensation 
actually be paid, but only that the possibility of compensation exists. The theory is such that it 
need not leave each person at least as well off. In fact, an improvement can often leave 
individuals worse off. A situation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if and only if no other Kaldor-
Hicks improvement from that situation exists.40 Were compensation to be paid to losers, 
however, Kaldor-Hicks distributions would be translated into Pareto-superior ones.  
2. Why Kaldor-Hicks efficiency? 
The normative relationship between Pareto-criteria and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency needs to be 
further explicated.  As elaborated in Posner’s Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, if 
the rudiments of wealth maximisation are applied, both Pareto-criteria share the same ethical 
justificatory premises of consent and liberty.41 This means to say that, as consent forms the 
operational basis to which market transactions are concluded, formed through the exercise of 
individual liberty, Pareto-superiority is justified on the basis that actions freely consented to 
are superior than any other allocation of rights. In effect, the transaction is wealth 
maximising.42 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency equally shares the consent and libertarian criteria. The 
concept is premised on the basis of hypothetical compensation, and hence a state of Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency is arrived at through a series of voluntary transactions. These premises will 
be discussed further in section D.4 below. However, for the purposes of this section, a brief 
understanding would help elucidate several important differences, which is important in 
helping justify the choice between the existing criteria.  
The paradigms can be described through the following examples:  
I. Pareto-optimal: X and Y exchange goods on a mutual basis.43 This is Pareto-
optimal as both individuals express consent to the transaction through exercise of 
liberty. 
II. Pareto-superior: X and Y do not exchange with one another due to a market 
failure. X is awarded a good, which if awarded to Y, would have been inefficient 
																																																						
39 Richard Posner, ‘The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal 
Studies 243, 244 (emphasis added). 
40 Edward Stringham, ‘Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and The Problem of Central Planning’ (2001) 4 The Quarterly 
Journal of Austrian Economics 41, 43. 
41 Richard Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7). 
42 This will be further explored below under section C.3.  
43 Coleman (n 35) 533. 
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given that Y would have sold it to X anyways. X, however, compensates Y, and 
hence is indifferent between his current state and his position originally if awarded 
the good. This is Pareto-superior, in that the individuals consent by accepting 
compensation ex post.44  
III. Kaldor-Hicks: X and Y do not exchange with one another due to a market failure. 
X is awarded a good, which if awarded to Y, would have been inefficient given 
that Y would have sold it to X. In this case, however, Y is not compensated by X or 
anyone else, and is therefore worse off than he was prior to the assignment.45 In 
this case, the possibility of compensation exists, although no particular transaction 
has taken place.  
The relationship between the normative paradigms are such that they are often 
interrelated, and at times confused. Coleman, for example, questioned why anyone would 
choose a Kaldor-Hicks paradigm over a Pareto-superior one: ‘[i]n what sense can we say 
losing parties in Kaldor-Hicks wealth improvements, consent to institutions that make them 
less well-off but are wealth maximising?’46 In other words, why would we choose an efficient 
state in which some individuals are made worse off, and how could that possibly be wealth 
maximising?  
Two further interrelated questions abound. First, would individuals under uncertainty 
even choose wealth over other social goals to begin with? Second, in pursuing wealth, would 
they choose the Kaldor-Hicks criterion over other Pareto arrangements? The question of why 
wealth maximisation is a worthy goal in this context will be discussed under section C.3. The 
second question, being Coleman’s enquiry, highlights several important elements. First, the 
relationship between Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto-superiority is not disparate: as mentioned, 
were ex ante compensation realised, Kaldor-Hicks would be transformed into a Pareto-
superior one.47 The theory of ex ante compensation and principle of consent48 leaves market 
participants in a position whereby they have agreed to the outcome. But even if not, assuming 
the outcome was rejected, the possibility for realising ex post compensation exists. This 
justifies why the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is less stringent than a Pareto-superior one.49 Second, 
																																																						
44 ibid. 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid 534. 
47 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7). 
48 Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm’ (n 7) 494. 
49 KH-efficiency has more often formed the basis for policy decision-making given its more realistic 
methodology, as compared to Pareto-superiority and optimality. A reallocation is only a Pareto-improvement if 
one person is made better off without making any other person worse off. In practice, this is usually impossible. 
KH-efficiency focuses on potential improvements instead of direct efficiency goals in themselves (ie does a 
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a system whereby compensation is paid and accepted ex post, ie in a Pareto-superior 
paradigm, is more costly than one in which compensation is not paid, or rather, not yet paid. 
In wealth maximisation terms, the initial lower costs would maximise the stated goals of 
efficiency. Under a hypothetical compensatory scenario, one could also expect the overall 
social costs to be lower, given that claims are made through the test of negligence, not strict 
liability.50 Wealth is maximised under this paradigm assuming only meritorious claims with 
plausible causes of action arise, with compensation fully provided only when successful.51  
It is important to further explicate the element of consent.52 When parties transact, 
they consent to their losses. In Posner’s words, ‘if you buy a lottery ticket and lose the lottery, 
then, so long as there is no question of fraud or duress, you have consented to the loss.’53 This 
assumption of course is highly simplistic, in the sense that not everyone who transacts agrees 
to an unlimited amount of losses stemming from any one particular transaction. But it is 
sufficient to assume that, in most contexts, participants share some form of reciprocal 
acceptance of liability. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is most applicable in the CRA context for 
that reason. When transacting under conditions of uncertainty, one cannot deny that investors 
are consenting to the possible risks for losses. Saying otherwise would be deceiving oneself 
over the conditions of financial market volatility. Equally, in providing ratings, we can 
assume CRAs’ consent to the possibility of facing claims for compensation. In explicating the 
idea of consent, this article finds the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency paradigm as the most 
appropriate in assessing whether liability rules in the CRA context are wealth maximising.54  
Finally, note that the choice for opting for Kaldor-Hicks over Pareto-superiority is 
also a practical one.55 The need to measure utility directly is near impossible, and to consider 
this amongst all groups in society on top of pecuniary allocation will often leave the Pareto-
criterion unsatisfied, as there is no way of determining whether the ‘utility to the winners of 
not having to pay compensation will exceed the disutility of the losers of not receiving 
																																																																																																																																																																								
transaction improve us toward Pareto-efficiency?). For an introduction into the seminal works of KH-efficiency, 
see John Hicks, ‘The Foundations of Welfare Economics’ (1939) 49 The Economic Journal 696; Nicholas 
Kaldor, ‘Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’ (1939) 49 The Economic 
Journal 549. 
50 The lower cost in wealth maximisation terms is assumed given that there would be a lower number of claims 
made under a negligence regime compared to a strict liability one, as only meritorious ones with a sufficient 
probability of succeeding would arise. In the case of the recent financial crisis, for example, if a strict liability 
regime was adopted in the case of misratings, we can assume that the number of claims would have been 
extremely large, and hence the estimated social costs likely to be much higher. 
51 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7). 
52 ibid. 
53 Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm’ (n 7) 492. 
54 See Kaldor (n 49); Hicks (n 49).  
55 Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm’ (n 7) 488. 
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compensation.’56 In the context of financial markets, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency provides a far 
more administrable approximation, and hence forms the basis for assessment in this article. 
3. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and Wealth Maximisation: A Criteria for Measurement 
As aforementioned, the concept of wealth maximisation is assumed to be society’s most 
efficient goal.57 It is separate from utilitarianism in the sense that it is concerned not with the 
aggregate utilitarian effect of promoting overall happiness, but more with the maximisation 
of wealth in dollar terms.58  
Proponents of wealth maximisation do not necessarily answer the question of why 
wealth should be the goal pursued under conditions of uncertainty.59 There are various 
normative and ethical foundations illuminating this question, most of which are beyond the 
scope of this article,60 but ‘whether rational choice under uncertainty would dictate the 
pursuit of wealth as opposed to, say, Rawls’ two principles of justice, or to some variant of 
utilitarianism’,61 is a question that needs to be briefly considered.  
The adoption of wealth maximisation alleviates arbitrary initial assignment of rights.62 
An objection to the moral adjudication of investors’ rights and duties is that the assignment 
often provides no tangible criterion for justifying any one particular allocation of rights. The 
unified goal for all market participants in the financial sector is, presumably, the pursuit of 
wealth. There are few reasons one could think of for participating beyond that. The choice of 
wealth maximisation therefore serves a valuable basis for evaluating efficiency, irrespective 
of whether it is pursued for intrinsic or instrumental value.63 
In defining comparable states of affairs, a criterion for measurement is required 
simpliciter. The preference for measuring wealth as the desired efficiency criterion in this 
context is twofold. Wealth provides a more objective assessment in the context of CRAs and 
financial markets. In defining comparable states of affairs, the objective assessment of costs 
and benefits to financial market participants are plausible.64 Wealth maximisation, unlike 
utilitarianism or utility, also better avoids the Scitovsky Paradox,65 which is a relevant 
consideration when evaluating the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Incorporating utility or justice 
																																																						
56 ibid 491. 
57 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7). 
58 ibid 104. 
59 See however, Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm’ (n 7). 
60 See for eg, Kaplow and Shavell (n 9)Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’ (n 12); Coleman (n 35). 
61 Coleman, ‘Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximisation’ (n 35), 539. 
62 Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm’ (n 7) 496. 
63 See Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’ (n 12). 
64 Coleman (n 35). 
65 This means that two states of affairs are Kaldor-Hicks efficient to one another. See Coleman (n 35) 519. 
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would mean considering a whole host of non-exhaustive factors, which in the context of 
financial markets would not be necessary, at least in explicit terms. 
Let us assume therefore that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency deems outcomes as efficient 
when monetary wealth is maximised.66 The key evaluation is society’s willingness to pay in 
accordance to its assessment of alternative outcomes.67 Consider, for example, two parties 
who enter into a voluntary arrangement that causes pollution to society. The initial 
arrangement would seem repulsive from a moral standpoint, but it would be considered a 
Kaldor-Hicks improvement if both parties are willing to compensate the victims of pollution. 
In Kaldor-Hicks terms, wealth maximisation is realised. Applying this to the context of CRAs 
would mean a state where both CRAs and investors are willing to pursue their transactions (ie 
CRAs continue to rate, investors continue relying on ratings), with both parties willing to 
accept the level of compensation imposed (or not imposed), whether through liability rules or 
otherwise. Different standards of liability would alter the incentives of both parties to 
transact, potentially increasing or lowering the wealth of market participants and others.  
4. Assignment of property rights under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
In legal-economic analysis, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency can be utilised as a basis for considering 
different assignment of rights in finding one paradigm that truly maximises wealth. Say for 
example we have to decide on a policy of whether to allow the building of a factory in a quiet 
neighbourhood. Approving the policy would mean assigning new rights and duties to the 
factory owners (as well as other members). If – having taken into account all other possible 
costs and benefits to other members of the neighbourhood – they are considered the winners, 
given that they gain more than other members of the neighbourhood, the net gain in welfare 
is wealth maximising from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective, given the possibility for hypothetical 
compensation in pecuniary terms.  
The analysis can be extended further. Assume we have to decide on a suitable liability 
regime for compensating workers. The assignment of rights and duties to both owners and 
workers then depends on the liability regime. A strict liability regime for, say, compensating 
all injured parties working within a 50-mile radius of the factory, whether caused by the 
factory or not, may end up forcing the operation of the factory elsewhere, or the closing of 
their operations altogether.68 If this happens then further social welfare may be lost.69 The 
																																																						
66 See Kaldor (n 49); Hicks (n 49). 
67 Stringham, ‘Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and The Problem of Central Planning’ (n 40) 42. 
68 This is an extreme example, but is used for the benefit of illustration. 
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volume of claims ex post would also reduce total wealth.70 A negligence regime which 
enables the possibility for injured workers to claim compensation on the other hand leaves 
open the possibility for valid claims. The operation of the factory would then depend on 
whether the owners consent to ex ante compensation, having considered the relevant law and 
legal standards. If they do, wealth is maximised, given that every transaction entered into is a 
potentially Pareto-superior exchange, and the possibility of hypothetical compensation exists.  
The model is extreme in the sense that many non-pecuniary factors in the Paretian 
sense are ignored. For example, the utility or disutility from pollution, happiness levels, or 
discontentment in general are not measured, partly given the impossibility of the task. Pareto-
efficiency would therefore potentially provide a very different result. The article will now 
turn to consider the application of the Kaldor-Hicks paradigm to the CRA liability context.  
 
D. KALDOR-HICKS EFFICIENCY: APPLICATION TO THE CONTEXT OF 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
1. Rating agencies inside the Edgeworth-Boxley box 
The difference between Pareto-optimality, Pareto-superiority, and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency  
can be usefully summarised by the Edgeworth-Boxley Box71 in Figure 1(b) below:   
																																																																																																																																																																								
69 This ultimately depends on whether the losses from forced reallocation (ie higher unemployment, lower 
productivity in the area etc) outweighs the benefits arising from it (ie lower pollution levels, social externalities, 
etc).  
70 This is assuming the factory decides to stay put, instead of reallocating. 
71 The Edgeworth-Boxley Box is a conceptual device to represent the distribution of resources and its efficient 
allocation among actors. For more details, see Thomas M. Humphrey, ‘The Early History of the Box Diagram’ 
(1996) 82 Federal Reserve Bank Richmond Economic Quarterly 37. 
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Figure 1(b): Edgeworth-Bowley Box (CRA-investor context).72 
 
Assume a = initial distribution between CRAs’ right to rate and investors’ right to 
rate, given initial assignment of rights under the common law context. 
A. The ‘right to rate’ depends on statutory imposition.73 For CRAs, it would mean 
greater mandated statutory reliance on ratings, hence the right to rate more financial 
products. For investors, it would mean the right to rely on personal ratings.74 
																																																						
72 This model is applied and adopted from Coleman (n 35) 514. See further, Bebchuk, ‘The Pursuit of a Bigger 
Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice? (1980) 8 Hofstra Law Review 671, 691–694. 
73 See Frank Partnoy, ‘Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis’ (2009) University 
of San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series 09-015, who argues for the need to move away from 
mandating reliance on credit ratings for financial products.  
74 This is an obscure but tenable form of assumed allocation of rights. In reality, both CRAs and investors have 
absolute rights to these factors (CRAs can rate whatever they want, investors can choose to rely on whichever 
rating they choose). However, for the benefit of this analysis, we require a feasible means to assume some form 
of allocative paradigm. We assume therefore with an increase in statutory mandatory reliance on a CRA rating, 
the right for investors to rely on their personal rating reduces. Likewise, the opposite occurs if statutory reliance 
is mitigated. The term ‘personal rating’ could be taken to mean ‘personal credit assessment’, by whatever 
means.  
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B. The increase and reduction in compensation for losses reflect the relevant CRA 
liability regime: (i) reducing compensation for losses entails a less stringent liability 
regime; (ii) increasing compensation for losses means a stricter liability regime.  
C. In ranking order of preferences, both can be viewed as intrinsic values in themselves: 
(i) reducing compensation would mean a preference for CRAs toward not wanting to 
face the prospect of compensating investors; (ii) increasing compensation for 
investors would mean a preference toward having the option for claiming damages.  
D. The line drawn through a, b, d represents investors’ indifference curve with respect to 
mandatory reliance on ratings and reduction in potential compensation for losses.  
E. The line through a, c, d represents CRAs’ indifference curve with respect to investors 
reliance on personal ratings and increase in potential compensation for losses. 
F. A move from a to b is Pareto-superior as investors are no worse off (b being on the 
indifference curve), while CRAs are better off (b being further from CRA origin).  
G. A move from a to c is also Pareto-superior as it makes investors better off while 
CRAs are not worse off.  
H. A move from a to e is Pareto-superior, making both investors and CRAs better off.  
I. The lens, which forms the shaded area between the indifference curves drawn through 
a, represents all possible Pareto-superior moves from a.  
J. The points of common tangency of investors’ and CRAs’ curves represent Pareto-
optimal distributions.  
K. The line x, y drawn through these points is the contract curve (although in this context 
there is no actual contract between third party investors and CRAs; however, we can 
assume the contract curve represents the willingness to rate and to rely on ratings). 
L. Points b and c represent Pareto-optimal allocations that are also Pareto-superior to a. 
M. The move from point a to f is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, since at f CRAs could 
compensate investors so that investors would be no worse off than at b, and CRAs 
would still be better off than both a and b (further from their origin).75 
Paragraph 13 describes wealth maximisation from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective. To 
further illustrate: at point a, investors would have to rely equally on the same amount of 
mandatory ratings as at f, except that they have a greater possibility for claiming 
compensation for losses at a than at f. If the liability regime is adjusted so that investors and 
CRAs move to point f, the initial presumption is that investors would lose out given the 
																																																						
75 Coleman (n 35) 514. 
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inability to make the greater number of civil claims they were entitled to at a. In actuality, 
however, investors would not be worse off since CRAs could compensate investors to the 
level at b (point of indifference). CRAs, on the other hand, are better off at f given the less 
stringent liability regime imposed, which enables them to maximise profits whilst still facing 
the possibility for hypothetical compensation. In this sense, wealth is maximised.76  
2. Assignment of rights under the CRA III  
The article will now turn to consider the assignment of rights under the CRA III. The liability 
regime as introduced in article 35(a) thereof reads: 
Where a credit rating agency has committed, intentionally or with gross 
negligence, any of the infringements listed in Annex III having an impact on a 
credit rating, an investor or issuer may claim damages from the credit rating 
agency for damage caused to it due to that infringement.77  
The provision further reads that investors may claim damages where ‘[i]t establishes that it 
has reasonably relied, in accordance with Article 5a(1) or otherwise with due care, on a 
credit rating for a decision to invest into, hold or divest from a financial instrument covered 
by that credit rating’.78 
Article 35(a) of the CRA III makes clear the assignment of property rights to investors 
and issuers for damages caused by inaccurate ratings. Prior to the imposition of statutory 
liability rules, civil liability claims by investors against CRAs were rarely successful.79 The 
elements necessary in proving a cause of action in a negligent misrepresentation claim, for 
example, were difficult given that public investors were generally too far removed from 
establishing sufficient proximity.80 The following points help summarise some of the relevant 
challenges: 
A. Contractual claims: barred due to lack of privity; issuer-pay model meant that only 
issuers, not investors, had grounds to bring contractual claims against CRAs.81 
B. Negligent misrepresentation claims (or other claims arising from a duty of care): 
I. Duty of care: proving a duty of care requires investors to establish the 
applicability of one of the following categories: (i) assumption of responsibility, 
																																																						
76 Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm’ (n 7). 
77 CRA III (n 10) art 35(a) (emphasis added). 
78 ibid (emphasis added). 
79 Andenas and Chiu, Financial Regulation (n 6) 220–226. 
80 Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 1 All ER 568. 
81 See Haar (n 1).  
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(ii) Caparo,82 and/or (iii) the incremental test.83 The elements in Caparo require 
establishing (as separate from the standalone tests mentioned in (i) and (iii)):  
A. CRA’s assumption of responsibility for investors’ reliance on ratings;84 
B. that the loss was reasonably foreseeable,85 the relationship was sufficiently proximate, 
and it was fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty of care; and  
C. the incremental test applies, ie that the law should develop novel categories of 
negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories.86 
II. Breach of duty: upon establishing a duty of care, investors would then have to 
prove that CRAs have fallen below the standard of care reasonably expected by a 
competent rating agency. These have been traditionally difficult given that ratings 
are regarded as ‘opinions’, not ‘statements of fact’.87 
I. Causation: upon establishing duty and breach of duty (of care), proving causation 
would require investors to establish that ‘but for' the ratings the investors would 
have been better off; the damage caused could be the losses stemming from either:  
I. the effective yield from rated bonds or securities being too low in relation to risks, 
which flows from the beginning of purchasing the overrated security; or 
II. maximum losses (ie principal sum plus expected yield or interest payments) in the 
wake of default of an overrated bond.88  
The causation element is difficult for investors to prove given that they would have to 
establish that reliance on the ratings was ex ante reasonable, despite the extra steps 
taken in the wider context of their due diligence.89 
With the imposition of statutory liability post-CRA III, the assignment of rights to 
investors and duties owed by CRAs are clearly enhanced. The breach of investors’ property 
rights to fair and accurate ratings would trigger a plausible cause of action on two possible 
grounds:  
																																																						
82 Caparo (n 80). 
83 Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28 (see Lord Bingham). 
84 ibid. 
85 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100. 
86 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 481. 
87 See Bisset v Wilkinson [1927] AC 177, New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254, 269. See also Andenas 
and Chiu, Financial Regulation (n 6) 220–224. 
88 Kern Alexander, ‘Tort Liability for Ratings of Structured Securities Under English Law’ (2015) 11 
International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 26. 
89 McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co [1962] 1 WLR 295 and Quinn v McGraw-Hill Co Inc (1999) 168 F3d 
331, 336, where the court held that CRA statements ‘should have alerted Quinn to the fact that he was 
responsible for doing his own homework about the risks he was assuming’ (emphasis added). 
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I. Fraudulent misrepresentation90 (ie intentionally providing false ratings to profit); 
or 
II. Negligent misrepresentation (ie miscalculating the assessment for ratings and 
falling below the expected level of standard of care).  
The quantification of losses, as described under the causation element earlier, would 
arise from the failure of CRAs in performing their duties with reasonable care and skill, either 
from: 
I. The bond or security being overrated, causing pecuniary losses to investors; or 
II. The failure of CRAs to adjust their bond ratings to reflect appropriate market 
risk.91  
In comparing the previous assignment of rights and duties with the current context, it 
is clear that several hurdles to make a potential claim have been removed. First, establishing 
contractual relationships is no longer necessary, given that an avenue for redress exists with 
the imposition of statutory liability. Second, the regulation makes clear that investors have 
property rights toward reasonable returns from relying on rating information, and that CRAs 
owe a duty of care when providing such information. Previous arguments claiming that 
public investors lacked sufficient proximity have therefore been removed. Whether a claim is 
successful, however, depends on the remaining elements of breach and causation, which 
requires proving the ‘but for’ test and reasonable reliance, in that their reliance on ratings 
was reasonable despite the wider context of their personal credit risk assessment.92 The 
hurdles in proving these elements remain equally challenging, as investors would have to 
prove they did not solely or mechanistically rely on credit ratings in their assessment of 
financial firms or products.93 Third, the regulation enlists a non-exhaustive range of causes 
for breach of duty under Annex III, which provides investors greater protection of rights.94  
These are but some examples of factors that have changed in between paradigms. This 
article makes no attempt to identify all of them. However, a brief summary is provided 
below:  
 
 
 
																																																						
90 Ellis, Fairchild and D’Souza (n 4). 
91 Kleinlow (n 13) 144. 
92 CRA III (n 10) art 5a(1). 
93 ibid. 
94 ibid Annex III. 
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Table 1(a): Comparison of pre- and post-CRA III paradigms. 
 
3. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and CRA III: A positive analysis 
A positive inquiry illuminates a relational property of states of affairs,99 which if carefully 
considered, should reveal if one state of affairs (E’) is more efficient than another (E) in 
Kaldor-Hicks terms, provided that those whose welfare increases in the move from E to E’ 
are capable of fully compensating the losers, leaving E’ with a net gain in welfare.100  
The interplay of rights and duties in this context would involve considering the 
allocation of rights between investors and CRAs before and after the implementation of 
																																																						
95 Commissioners of Customs and Excise (n 83). 
96 Caparo (n 80). See also Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) 
[2012] FCA 1200. 
97 CRA III (n 10) art 35(a). 
98 Andenas and Chiu, Financial Regulation (n 6) 223–225. 
99 Coleman (n 35) 513. 
100 ibid. 
Assignment of rights  Before CRA III Post-CRA III 
Contractual rights Lack of privity No longer necessary  
 
Duty of care (negligence) Must prove: (i) assumption of 
responsibility;95 (ii) duty 
reasonably foreseeable, sufficient 
proximity exists, and fair, just, 
reasonable to impose duty96  
Duty of care owed 
(statutory duty)97 
 
 
 
 
Breach of duty (negligence) Ratings fall below standard of 
care; ratings regarded ‘opinions’ 
Similar standard 
applies; ratings 
regarded ‘opinions’ 
 
Causation (negligence) Reliance on ratings ‘reasonable’; 
personal due diligence conducted. 
Similar standard; 
reliance ‘reasonable’ 
despite due diligence98 
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article 35(a) of CRA III.101 The first point to note and acknowledge in this context would be 
the initial assignment of investor property rights. The presumption removes the incalculable 
ex ante risks involved with anterior determination of property rights.102 
In determining whether there has been an investors’ net increase in welfare, by 
explicating the principle of ex ante compensation, a positive description reveals very little in 
terms of actual overall net effects. The position of investors prior to the liability regime 
functions on the same premise of ex ante compensation as it would post-CRA III. 
Participating in financial investments, whether through relying on financial ratings or 
personal due diligence, incorporates the element of consent.103 Financial market volatility is a 
presumed risk. Any reliance on credit ratings as an external certification functions on the 
premise of accepting marginal deviations from absolute certainty.104 Perfect knowledge in our 
world is often misjudged as a locum for pretended knowledge, and any rational investor 
consents to these risks when incorporating rating information into his credit assessment.105  
The principle of consent reveals a fundamental problem with stringent liability 
regimes. Reliance on public ratings is even more problematic given that the decision to do so 
is voluntary. In publishing rating information, investors consent to whichever rating they opt 
to believe. If CRAs were a publishing company, a reader merely has to avoid reading the 
section if he or she believes there are grounds for substantial misinformation, or at least, 
grounds for deviation in opinions, risks and beliefs. But at the same time the principle of 
consent oversimplifies other important causalities. One may often read news from a reliable 
publishing company, say the British Broadcasting Channel (BBC), only to find the occasional 
misinformation. The question therefore is more appropriately addressed as to whether the 
ultimate suffering of harm for investors was so far removed that ‘but for’ the inaccuracy of 
public credit rating, the investor would have been better off.106 
Even if we were unable to elicit express consent in any case, a possibility given that it 
is a non-contractual reliance,107 the finding of implicit consent should not be abandoned.108 In 
																																																						
101 CRA III (n 10) art 35(a). 
102 In other words, investors no longer have to bear the risks of assessing whether they will have an avenue to 
make a claim, as this is provided for under CRA III (assuming they suffer grave losses stemming from a 
misrated financial product). See Richard Epstein, ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’ (1973) 2 Journal of Legal 
Studies 151. 
103 Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm’ (n 7) 494. 
104 Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton Mifflin Boston 1921) 232–233. 
105 Andreas Horsch, ‘Civil Liability of Credit Rating Companies – Qualitative Aspects of Damage Assessment 
from an Economic Viewpoint’ (2015) 11 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 107, 120. 
106 Alexander, ‘Tort Liability for Ratings of Structured Securities Under English Law’ (n 16). 
107 The objection to consent in the CRA context however may be furthered on the basis that explicit or implicit 
consent cannot be found where no contractual relationship exists. This is valid but not fundamental to our 
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finding that investors have relied on ratings, they have equally implied their confidence in the 
ratings, even if they have wavered away from their personal credit assessments. Laziness, 
oversight, or mechanistic reliance are not grounds for then avoiding personal due diligence in 
performing credit assessments. Doing so would only bolster the claim that investors 
consented, at least in part, given their indifference. 
Positive analysis therefore reveals that investors are not in a worse position after the 
crisis by virtue of ex ante compensation.109 In being part of a system of tort rules, a rational 
investor can be expected to perform accident-avoidance measures without ex post 
compensation.110 If one were to invest based on the conviction of positive ratings, 
considering the relevant liability regime and factoring plausible liability claims are assumed 
ex ante measures. 
However, to explicate the position as such in the context of financial markets would 
be an oversimplification. The complexity of the credit rating business, as described by many 
commentators,111 posits fundamental problems underlying the theory of ex ante 
compensation. The aggressive desire to profit and conflicts of interest reveal the fundamental 
problem of consenting to relying on rating information of issuers who themselves pay for the 
rating by rating agencies.112 The question is whether other forms of external certifications are 
sufficient to provide grounds for informed decision-making,113 one that would consolidate the 
notion of consent. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion has to be modified in this sense, taking into 
account that consent prior to the financial crisis was severely obscured by the motives for 
financial profiteering.114 The criteria for ‘voluntary exchange’ that is Pareto-optimal between 
participants is severely weakened in this sense.  
4. The obscurity of consent: moving to a Kaldor-Hicks efficient paradigm 
																																																																																																																																																																								
analysis. The matter of consent is substantive with varying degrees of form and kind. There are differences of 
degree between, for example, interpreting explicit contracts to effectuate the intentions of parties, and creating 
tort duties based on purely hypothetical contracts. The latter involves efficacious judicial intervention, whereas 
the former is express and agreed. The element consent can exist in both. As long as CRAs and investors 
understand that ratings are being relied upon, the consensual criterion is fulfilled.  
108 Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm’ (n 7) 494. 
109 Richard Posner, ‘Epstein’s Tort Theory: A Critique’ (1979) 8 Journal of Legal Studies 457, 464. 
110 ibid 464. 
111 Eg Iris Chiu, ‘Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in the EU: In Search of a Coherent Regulatory Regime’ 
(2014) 25 European Business Law Review 269; Mads Andenas, ‘Liability for Regulators and Public 
Authorities’ (2007) European Business Law Review 1; John Coffee, ‘Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The 
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms’ (2004) 237 Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper 1. 
112 See Joshua Krebs, ‘The Rating Agencies: Where We Have Been and Where Do We Go From Here? (2009) 3 
Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and The Law 133. 
113 Stephen Choi, ‘Market Lessons for Gatekeepers’ (1998) 92 Northwestern University Law Review 916.  
114 Kane (n 2) 405. 
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In an ideal world free from transaction costs or information problems,115 in which individuals 
are rational and knowledgeable, the ‘exercise of liberty leads to Pareto-optimal states of 
affairs through a series of Pareto-superior exchanges’.116 As mentioned, the state of Pareto-
optimality is very difficult, if not impossible, to imagine in the context of financial 
markets.117 Given the incompleteness of the theory of ex ante compensation previously, due 
to the obscurity of consent, it is fair to presume the existence of market failure by virtue of 
information asymmetries.118 From a positive perspective, the liability regime under CRA III 
can be seen as an attempt to correct, or perhaps codify, a pre-existing allocation of rights. 
 Intervention in markets are based on some notion of market imperfection.119 As 
underlined by Posner:  
The role of government intervention in any case is to mimic or simulate the allocative 
forces of the free market through the imposition of legal sanctions, thereby providing 
for the proper allocation of resources that would have taken place under more 
desirable market conditions.120  
In a perfectly free market, free from third party and external effects, we can presume that an 
investor would have the right to rely on ratings, and CRAs the right to provide ratings, and 
both would exchange Pareto-superior transactions until they achieve a state of Pareto-
optimality. An investor would continue to rely on ratings as long as it benefits their 
investments; a CRA would continue to rate products as long as it continues to be profitable. 
Both are wealth maximising transactions. Forbidding the transactions, unless assessed on 
some basis of market imperfection, would reduce both the wealth of society and personal 
autonomy.121 The question of assignment of rights from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective therefore 
is whether the new assignment of rights enhances wealth and provides for a net gain in 
welfare.122  
In considering investors’ previous assignment of rights, the plausibility of ex ante 
compensation and consent are generally weaker given the lack of codification and clarity of 
avenues for redress. Consenting to reliance on ratings does not mean consenting to excessive 
																																																						
115 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
116 Coleman (n 35) 541. 
117 Fama (n 20); Leland and Pyle, ‘Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial 
Intermediation’ (1977) 32 The Journal of Finance 371. 
118 ibid. 
119 John Coffee, ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System’ (1984) 70 Virginia 
Law Rev 717. 
120 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7) 110. 
121 The question of personal autonomy is quite distinct from wealth maximisation, although the goals often 
coincide. See Posner, ‘The Ethical and Political Basis of Efficiency’ (n 7) 495. 
122 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7). 
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risk-taking.123 Nor does it mean consenting to fraudulent or grossly negligent misconduct. 
Coleman’s argument therefore aids our analysis in highlighting the need to bolster the criteria 
for consent and acceptance of ex post compensation levels.  
But a fine distinction needs to be made clear. The enhancement post-CRA III, if any, 
is provided not from changing the consensual basis on which investors choose whether to rely 
on ratings. The intervention in the market is merely to mimic the implicit consensual basis of 
investors of not intending to go so far as to agreeing to any form of fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation.124 This can be presumed to be the intention of any rational investor in a 
free market. The enhancement of wealth therefore lies with the possible realisation of ex ante 
incentives into ex post compensation, which, when realised, becomes a Pareto-superior 
exchange.125 In contemporary contexts, therefore, with the codification of investors’ property 
rights and personal obligations, the consensual element is merely codified to reflect an 
already existing implicit consent, but which provides for greater ex ante and, potentially, ex 
post compensation, assuming rational investors take note of both the risks and legal standards 
applicable when relying on ratings.  
But an additional consideration is required. If one were to further consider elements of 
opportunity cost, the alternatives to investors for external certifications are not great.126 Does 
this imply limitations on an investor’s ability to consent freely? And if so, is it still wealth 
maximising from a Kaldor-Hicks lens for investors to be assigned rights to compensation? 
The first can be answered simply on the basis that in any market with scarce allocation of 
resources, sellers and buyers would have to make informed decisions. This is no different 
from choosing products in any other free market, which provides varying degrees of quality, 
suppliers, and buyers. Limitation of consent should only be a concern when a transaction is 
completely, or for the most part, involuntary. In the context of financial investments, in 
particular with published ratings, this cannot be assumed. Intervention in this context would 
be analogous to a judge’s imputation and rewriting of the parties’ intention in a contractual 
transaction.127 But assuming consent is obscured through misrepresentations and overrating, 
the right to compensation, as under the current regime, maximises investors’ wealth from a 
Kaldor-Hicks lens as they are able to translate their intentions ex post.128 
																																																						
123 Coleman (n 35) 533. 
124 CRA III (n 10) art 35(a). 
125 Coleman (n 35). 
126 Choi (n 113). 
127 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7). 
128 Coleman (n 35). 
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To conclude whether wealth is maximised, however, would require considering the 
rights of investors in tandem with CRAs. The enhanced liability regime equally alters the ex 
ante compensation and incentives for CRAs to rate, reducing their willingness to consent to 
providing their ratings given the fear of potential liability claims. This is an argument usually 
brought by many fearing that a liability regime would chill the industry due to the fear of 
litigation floodgates.129 In economic terms, this would depend on how far off the indifference 
curve the CRA has been led to under the new liability regime (assuming above in Figure 1(b), 
beyond points a, c, d).  
In the pre-CRA III context, mandated reliance on ratings and lack of liability meant 
that CRAs would have more likely (and quite easily so) consented to the obligation of 
providing published ratings.130 The argument for lack of consent or autonomy in this case 
therefore is not a very relevant consideration. Although the question of whether CRAs would 
have consented to current compensation levels may be raised, it is likely that CRAs would 
have known fairly well that they are liable under the common law for any form of fraudulent 
or negligent misrepresentation claims, vis-à-vis public ratings or otherwise.131 The 
assignment and codification of duties under CRA III therefore provides an enhancement of an 
already existing correction of market imperfection, one that existed under the rudiments of 
law.132 
From a Kaldor-Hicks perspective therefore, the pre- and post-crisis relational states of 
affairs are not as disparate as it seems. CRA III typifies the consensual basis for the ideal 
market transaction. Both investors and CRAs under this paradigm would enter into 
transactions with greater ex ante compensation, and arguments discrediting investors’ 
personal consent to market risks or CRAs’ consent to liability are of little consequence. 
Assuming a hypothetical winner in this context is difficult.133 However, in terms of 
reallocation of rights and duties, investors seemed to have gained more in pecuniary terms 
(and, potentially, in utilitarian terms, although this is beyond the scope of this article)134 than 
CRAs in this context. These aspects will be considered further from a quantitative perspective 
below.  
 
E. NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY: A NORMATIVE INQUIRY 
																																																						
129 Andenas and Chiu, Financial Regulation (n 6) 223. 
130 Coffee, ‘Gatekeeper Failure and Reform’ (n 111). 
131 ibid. 
132 Caparo (n 80); Donoghue (n 85). 
133 This requires a quantitative assessment, some aspects of which will be considered below in Section F. 
134 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 7). 
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Aspects of negligence and strict liability require brief examination.135 The rules’ consistency 
with the ideals of a free market are pertinent to determining whether wealth maximisation as 
a criterion can be satisfied. The different assignments of rights and duties here alter 
incentives for partaking in market transactions, and hence are relevant to our discussion.136 
The importance of this discussion comes from the fact that many arguments for a 
strict liability regime have been made.137 Under strict liability, investors are allocated 
absolute rights and CRAs the duty to compensate for any resulting losses. This is problematic 
for several fundamental reasons. The foremost important aspect in this assessment is the 
principle of causality.138 In its simplest terms, the causal paradigm of strict liability would 
mean: because ‘A hit B, A is liable for B’s damages’.139 The assignment of rights is premised 
on moral absolutism, and ignores the reciprocal view of causation,140 which in economic 
terms, would mean disregarding efficiency as a normative criterion.  
Reliance on credit ratings for investment decisions forms only part of a host of 
relevant considerations. The assignment of absolute rights beyond that of the current context 
would lead to causation errors.141 Market risks and financial losses are formed through a 
whole host of variable factors. In an even narrower sense, an investment decision cannot be 
formed solely on a credit rating alone.142 To assume that credit ratings are the substantial or 
proximate cause-in-fact would be dismissive of other relevant factors. Brown’s Economic 
Theory of Liability positively illuminates the causative context from an efficiency 
perspective: in any one output, there exists a variety of relevant inputs.143  
Let us say we take the financial crisis as the relevant output that caused the eventual 
losses for investors, the probability of avoidance being denoted by P(X, Y, Z).144 The 
probability of the financial crisis in any given interval therefore is 1 – P(X,Y,Z). Consider X, 
Y and Z as the relevant inputs that form the probability of avoidance: 
																																																						
135 See Robert Cooter, ‘Economic Theories of Legal Liability’ (1991) 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 11; 
Mario Rizzo, ‘Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort’ (1980) 9 Journal of 
Legal Studies 291. 
136 Epstein (n 102). 
137 The seminal paper being Frank Partnoy, ‘Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal For A Modified Strict 
Liability Regime’ (2001) 79 Washington University Law Review 491. See also, Frank Partnoy, ‘Strict Liability 
for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee’ (2004) 5 University of San Diego Law and Economics Research 
Paper Series 1; Coffee, ‘Gatekeeper Failure and Reform’ (n 111). 
138 Robert Cooter, ‘Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on Causation’ (1987) 63 Chicago-
Kent Law Review 523. 
139 Posner, ‘Epstein’s Tort Theory: A Critique’ (n 109) 465. 
140 Coase (n 115). 
141 John Brown, ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Liability’ (1973) 2 Journal of Legal Studies 323.   
142 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accident (Yale University Press 1970). 
143 Brown (n 141) 323. 
144 There are certainly many more relevant inputs in practice. This is used merely for illustrative purposes. 
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I. X – avoidance costs for CRA, ie greater due care with providing ratings, etc; 
II. Y – avoidance costs for investors, ie performing greater due diligence, reviews, 
etc; 
III. Z – avoidance costs for issuers, ie issuing financial securities that are safe & 
reliable.  
The three inputs (X, Y, Z) are reciprocally causative to the financial crisis. The question 
from an efficiency perspective is, on which combination of avoidance measures, X, Y and Z, 
and the resulting probability of an accident, P(X,Y,Z), is the most preferred in terms of 
minimising social costs?145 From this perspective one could almost always argue that it 
should be Z, given the issuer’s position with regards to internal information and ability to 
create safer financial products.146 As one can imagine, the arguments can be rather circular 
without empirical data. But just to illuminate a figure for clarity: the value of collateralised 
debt obligations in the run-up to the financial crisis contributed to more than $2 trillion in 
losses and write-downs.147 Unless we assume that credit ratings are the single, most efficient 
means of avoiding the probability of the financial crisis, which leads us to the social optimum 
of least avoidance and expected social costs, a strict liability regime would be substantially 
more costly.148  
 
																																																						
145 Referred as social optimum, Brown (n 141) 325. 
146 Kane (n 2). 
147 David Fickling, ‘S&P, RBS Lose Appeal of Ruling Australian Towns Misled’ (Bloomberg, 6 June 2014) < 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-05/s-p-rbs-lose-appeal-on-ruling-they-misled-australian-investors> 
accessed 25 August 2016. 
148 The social costs of accidents can be summarized as: E(SC) = wx + p(x)A; where E(SC): expected social 
costs, x: level of precaution, w = cost per unit of precaution, p(x): probability of an accident, A: damage which 
results if the accident occurs. For a basic introduction, see Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 
(Pearson 2014) 219–266. 
	
Figure 2(a): Minimising social costs 
 
Under a strict liability regime, CRAs 
would have to pay for both total costs 
of precaution [wx] and costs of harm 
[p(x)A]. Under a negligence regime, if 
the standard of care is set at x*, there is 
possibility for bilateral precaution, and 
CRAs and investors would be 
incentivised to adopt the efficient level 
of precaution that minimises the social 
costs of accident.  
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     Figure 2(a): Expected social costs of accidents149 
 
The internalisation of externalities and minimisation of social costs have equally been 
argued as more effective under a strict liability regime.150 This is difficult to establish unless 
we adopt a non-consequentialist perspective. Strict liability would severely alter the 
incentives for CRAs to act as gatekeepers and, given the high concentration levels and 
barriers to entry in the certification market, would lead to a reduction in rating production and 
efficiency.151 Whether enhanced liability would necessarily lead to more accurate ratings 
which inherently improve investors’ rights is debatable. A socially optimal level of screening 
accuracy can only be truly incentivised by a competitive screening process, which requires 
enhancing competition levels.152 One also needs to consider the increased probability of 
frivolous claims that would be made by investors, given the inefficient level of care that 
would arise with the ability to ‘free ride’ on ratings without being liable for investment losses 
(see Figure 2[a]).153 If the sum of these costs exceeds the net welfare derived from a strict 
liability regime, the system would serve no means toward achieving the wealth maximisation 
criterion.154   
With the current assignment of property rights, provided the courts can decide the 
optimal level of care that induces efficient bilateral precaution, both investors and CRAs 
could be induced to internalise the appropriate amount of costs and increase levels of 
precaution.155  
The social cost function for bilateral precaution can be illustrated as the following:  
SC = wvxv + wixi + p(xv, xi)A156 
 
																																																						
149 This illustration is taken from Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics (n 148) 188. See also Guido Calabresi, 
The Costs of Accident (Yale University Press 1970). 
150 Frank Partnoy, ‘Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal For A Modified Strict Liability Regime’ 
(2001).79 Washington University Law Review 491. 
151 Choi (n 113). 
152 ibid. 
153 This would severely enhance CRA’s expected liability costs, potentially deterring them from rating further.  
154 For an economic analysis of the optimal level of care for CRAs, see Kleinlow (n 13). 
155 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics (n 148) 193-196. 
156 This notation is taken from Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics (n 148) 193. 
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         Figure 2(b): Expected costs with a discontinuity at x*157 
 
Assuming the legal standard is set at the efficient point at x* = x the negligence rule 
can provide perfect compensation for investors and incentivise efficient level of precaution 
from both investors and CRAs. The expected social cost can therefore be minimised at this 
level.158  
 From a normative standpoint, the negligence regime better satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion. The expected costs (wixi + p(xi)A), assuming CRAs incorporate the assessment of 
ex ante compensation and potential liability claims, would incentivise CRAs to increase their 
level of precaution to the socially efficient level of precaution, x*.  
 
F. QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE KALDOR-HICKS CRITERION 
From a quantitative aspect, we can see that the reallocation of rights has enabled investors to 
make stronger claims against CRAs. In the US, scores of investors have filed suits since the 
regulatory amendments brought under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act 2010, with a good number reaching financial settlements.159 In Australia, the 
Bathurst case resulted in a successful claim by investors for compensation of USD 18.8 
million.160 
																																																						
157 This illustration is taken from Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics (n 148) 193. 
158 ibid. 
159 See eg Timothy Martin, ‘Moody’s to Pay Calpers $130 Million to Settle Lawsuit’ (Wall Street Journal, 9 
March 2016) <www.wsj.com/articles/moodys-to-pay-calpers-130-million-to-settle-lawsuit-1457554312> 
accessed 25 August 2016; Aruna Viswanatha and Karen Freifeld, ‘S&P Reaches $1.5bn Deal With US, States 
Over Crisis-Era Ratings’ (Reuters, 3 February 2015) <www.reuters.com/article/us-s-p-settlement-
idUSKBN0L71C120150203> accessed 25 August 2016. 
160 Bathurst Regional Council (n 96); ABN AMRO (n 14).  
Figure 2(b): Functions 
wx + p(x)A: social cost (SC) 
wvxv: cost of taking precaution (investor)   
wixi: cost of taking precaution (CRA)  
p(xv,xi)A: cost of expected harm 
x*: socially efficient level of precaution 𝑥!: legal standard 
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Investors in the EU have yet to make a successful claim against a CRA. Nevertheless, 
the enhanced liability regime under CRA III clearly establishes the possibility for ex post 
compensation. The resulting greater probability for ex ante compensation (ie willingness to 
consent to the risks for relying on ratings, given greater clarity and confidence with avenues 
for redress) incentivises investors to continue relying on ratings, provided they do so non-
mechanistically and with due care. In pecuniary terms, the ability to rely should help them 
make better investment decisions to gain greater financial yields in the long run. 
For the sake of this analysis let us assume further that both factors (ie increase in 
compensation and reliance on ratings) are independent points of preferences. An increase in 
the possibility for claiming compensation does not necessarily lead to more investors relying 
on more ratings, given that some may prefer to maintain steady portfolios and perform their 
own due diligence. In this case, reliance on ratings may remain static. From a Kaldor-Hicks 
perspective, however, investors’ wealth would still be improved, given the enhanced 
possibility for ex ante compensation compared to the previous allocation of ratings. In Figure 
1(b), this would be a movement from point x to point a, which represents an increase in 
hypothetical compensation and movement away from the investor’s origin. 
The improvement for CRAs depends on whether the reallocation of enhanced duties to 
them would incentivise them to fall somewhere on the indifference curve (Figure 1(a): points 
a, c, d). There are potential arguments to be made that the enhanced liability regime may in 
fact have bolstered the legitimacy of CRAs.161 Regulation retained in mandating the 
requirements for rated products post-2008 has led to CRAs remaining confident of their role 
as an intermediary in the market.162 Recent profits reveal this level of indifference, as annual 
profits for the ‘Big Three’ have risen by 4% annually since 2010.163 Hence, although 
enhanced ex post liability is made possible, CRAs are willingly engaging with the ratings of 
mortgage-backed securities and corporate bonds, a market largely shared by the ‘Big Three’ 
(90%).164 We can therefore infer that most agencies have remained rather indifferent to the 
possibility of ex ante compensation. 
 
G. EVALUATION  
																																																						
161 The Economist, ‘Undue Credit: Regulation is Helping the Very Firm it is Designed to Tame’ (The 
Economist, 30 May 2015) <www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21652364-regulation-helping-
very-firms-it-designed-tame-undue-credit> accessed 25 August 2016. 
162 Frank Partnoy, ‘Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis’ (2009) University of 
San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series 09-015. 
163 The Economist (n 161). 
164 ibid. 
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The Kaldor-Hicks criterion therefore reveals that the reassignment of rights is efficient. The 
proposition for wealth maximisation, however, must again be considered. The question of 
whether we are truly achieving a better and more wealthy state with ex ante considerations is 
pertinent. How can such a reassignment bring any benefits in real terms? And how could a 
state of assignment that produces losers be considered wealth maximising?165  
The argument falls back on the normative ground that justifies Pareto-superior 
exchanges. Actions freely consented to involve the exercise of liberty, and any such 
transaction that involves the exercise of liberty are wealth maximising.166 One cannot 
approximate how or why wealth would be maximised otherwise. In the presence of a market 
failure barring potentially Pareto-superior exchanges, legal intervention is required to mimic 
free market transactions, or otherwise provide avenues for ex post compensation, or, in the 
case of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, ensuring ex ante compensation. As illustrated, assuming the 
legal standard of care is imposed at an efficient level, parties incorporate their expected costs 
of care and harm in justifying whether a particular transaction is to be concluded. The 
consequentialist means of risk estimation provides that any one transaction can be wealth 
maximising, unless market failures, presumably via information problems or transaction 
costs, intervene.  
The question of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency producing only empty wealth improvements 
therefore is answered on this basis of liberty and consent. Wealth does not mean producing 
anything of intrinsic value, but is instrumental to the achievement of other values.167 Why 
would an investor rely on a rating, unless he would want to achieve greater returns on his 
investments? The initial transaction is wealth maximising in leading to the latter. If reliance 
on the rating does not lead to any greater intrinsic value, the former decision was wealth 
maximising on the basis of being exercised with liberty and consent.    
 
H. CONCLUSION 
This article has revealed that the CRA III regime is efficient from a Kaldor-Hicks 
perspective. The problem may be reduced to the theory of ex ante compensation. Wealth is 
maximised not when parties merely have the liberty to contract, but when they have the 
liberty to contract with full consent of the risks involved. In this analysis, consenting to risks 
pre-CRA III is, as mentioned, obscured by the complexity and aggressiveness of CRAs, in 
																																																						
165 Coleman (n 36). 
166 Posner, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’ (n 8). 
167 ibid. 
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particular with the misratings of mortgage-backed securities. To assume that these 
transactions satisfied the wealth maximisation criterion is an oversimplification. This is 
where we can assume that the post-CRA III position has improved the CRA-investor 
transaction. The reassignment of rights not only maximises the wealth of investors through 
possible ex post compensation, but bolsters the ex ante compensation of parties through 
clearer avenues of redress. But to truly constitute a wealth maximisation transaction in a 
Kaldor-Hicks sense, we must identify some net gain in welfare. This is possible if we are 
willing to accept that an assignment of rights to investors to bolster ex ante compensation 
outweighs CRAs’ reduction in ability to publish ratings, with or without consent to 
compensating investors’ losses. In pecuniary terms, this could perhaps be a straightforward 
assessment, as both parties are collectively wealthier ex post. But if not, then the assignment 
of rights is arguably justifiable on a Rawlsian basis: we intuitively assume that investors 
should be afforded greater protection against CRAs. From an economic standpoint, a positive 
analysis of the rule’s efficiency not only validates that normative assignment, but aids our 
ability in potentially finding a more effective one. 
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